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Abstract: This paper presents the design, development, and validation of an ontology based SCADA intrusion detection
system. The proposed system analyses SCADA network communications and can derive additional infor-
mation based on the background knowledge and ontology models to enhance the intrusion detection data.
The developed intrusion model captures network communications, cyber attacks and the context within the
SCADA domain. Moreover, a set of semantic rules were constructed to detect various attacks and extract log-
ical relationships among these attacks. The presented framework was extensively evaluated and a comparison
to the state of the art is provided.
1 INTRODUCTION
Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA)
systems are used to monitor and control various crit-
ical infrastructures such as electrical generation and
distribution, petroleum plants, or nuclear plants. In
the past, SCADA networks operated in closed en-
vironments using legacy communication protocols.
However, modern networks are moving towards the
use of open standards and general information and
communications technology (ICT) to enhance their
systems interoperability, reduce cost, and enhance op-
erational management. For instance, the Modbus se-
rial communication protocol developed by Modicon
in 1979 is now being encapsulated into TCP/IP frames
in the newer version of Modbus TCP/IP, also referred
as Modbus TCP (Modbus, 2012).
Nevertheless, the incorporation of such open tech-
nologies in SCADA networks exposed them to a wide
range of vulnerabilities and cyber-attacks such as re-
connaissance, command injection, denial of service,
and response and measurement injection. As a re-
sult, the number of cyber incidents is significantly
increasing (Kang et al., 2014) which presents novel
challenges for both academic researchers and indus-
try experts.
In order to provide an adequate level of protec-
tion to SCADA networks, various types of SCADA-
specific intrusion detection systems (IDSs) have been
proposed (Zhu and Sastry, 2010). However, the cur-
rent generation of IDS systems in SCADA networks
are often faced with several challenges. First, the ma-
jority of the existing systems, especially signature-
based, are purely syntactic and lack a clear description
of intrusion behaviours and semantics of the moni-
tored systems (Barry and Chan, 2009). This issue
may result in missing the detection of sophisticated
attacks (Hadzˇiosmanovic´ et al., 2014) such as Stuxnet
(Langner, 2011) that may exploit legitimate looking
commands to cause damage on the system. Second,
intelligent capabilities such as reasoning over exist-
ing domain knowledge, which can assist in identify-
ing the logical relationships between various attacks
are missed by these IDS systems. This issue can result
in the need for intensive expertise and efforts to man-
ually analyse the connection between these attacks.
To address the above limitations, this paper
presents an ontology-based intrusion detection system
called OSCIDS (Ontology-based SCADA Intrusion
Detection System). OSCIDS is a knowledge-based
system that utilises ontology to extract semantic rela-
tions among attacks and detect intrusions. The devel-
oped ontology enables representing the main concepts
and semantic relations of network communications,
cyber-attacks, and inferring additional useful knowl-
edge from the existing background knowledge. The
main contributions of this paper are:
• A novel approach for intrusion detection in
SCADA networks using ontologies has been pro-
posed. In contrast to current signature-based tech-
niques, the proposed framework utilises the se-
mantic definitions of industrial network packets
and logical relationships between attacks to en-
hance the intrusion detection process.
• Formal semantic modelling of SCADA cyber in-
trusions and specification of Modbus TCP/IP in-
dustrial communications is presented. The con-
structed model provides an expressive representa-
tion of possible intrusions and enables new intru-
sion analysis capabilities such as the use of rea-
soning over existing knowledge and deriving ad-
ditional information from the raw packets.
• A set of semantic rules for background knowl-
edge inferences and intrusion detection has been
developed. These rules can utilise both raw packet
features and the derived features by the reasoning
process to detect various attacks or find their log-
ical relationship.
• The proposed framework prototype is developed
using open-source technologies. This enables sys-
tem extensibility and flexibility. Moreover, an
evaluation of the proposed framework is provided
with a comparison to the state-of-the-art IDS so-
lution.
This paper is organised as follows. Section 2
presents the background and related works. Section
3 discusses the development and the architecture of
proposed OSCIDS framework. Section 4 presents the
experimental results, while Section 5 concludes the
paper.
2 BACKGROUND AND RELATED
WORK
2.1 Modbus TCP/IP Communications
Overview
Modbus is a serial communications protocol devel-
oped by Modicon (now Schneider Electric) in 1979
for use in industrial networks. Modbus TCP, on the
other hand, refers to the encapsulated Modbus com-
munications into TCP/IP frames. The Modbus TCP
has a simple request/response architecture. A Modbus
client (Master) sends a packet to the Modbus server
requesting a specific command to be executed or to re-
turn some data. Various commands can be requested
which may include reading process measurements,
writing configurations, performing diagnostics oper-
ations, or executing a process control operation. The
server processes the received command and in many
cases returns a response indicating the status of com-
mand execution or describing any errors which oc-
curred.
Modbus TCP packet contains several features at
both network and application layers. The main fea-
tures of Modbus TCP packets are illustrated in Figure
1. These features include the TCP/IP headers and the
Modbus Application Layer (known as Modbus Appli-
cation Data Unit(ADU)) features.
Transaction ID
(2 bytes)
Protocol ID
(2 bytes)
Length
(2 bytes)
Unit ID
(1 byte)
Function Code
(1 byte)
Data
(252 bytes)
Modbus ADU  (Application Data Unit)TCP headerIP headerEthernet frame
 MBAP header (7 bytes)  PDU (253 bytes)| ||
TCP data| |
Figure 1: Modbus TCP packet structure
2.2 SCADA-Specific Intrusion
Detection Systems
In the literature, there exist a number of IDS proposals
that are specifically addressing the intrusion detection
problem in SCADA networks (Zhu and Sastry, 2010).
We will present some of the recent IDS proposals with
reference to Modbus communications.
Snort (Roesch et al., 1999) is an open source
signature-based intrusion detection system used in
many networks. Digital Bond Inc.(Peterson, 2009)
has developed a Modbus pre-processor and a set of
14 attack signature rules that captures various attacks.
These attacks are mainly reconnaissance, denial of
service, and unauthorised access commands. (Mor-
ris et al., 2013) presented a set of 50 Snort rules for
attack detection on Modbus communications over se-
rial lines and TCP/IP.
Other approaches that rely on anomaly detection
techniques have been proposed. (Mallouhi et al.,
2011) proposed an anomaly-based IDS for industrial
protocols including Modbus TCP/IP. Their system
consists of a Modbus and TCP analysers that use the
n-gram algorithm for intrusion detection. This system
was developed to detect several attacks such as spoof-
ing, TCP SYN flood, Modbus-specific attacks, De-
nial of service, and Man in the middle attacks. Nev-
ertheless, the authors provided only preliminary re-
sults. (Carcano et al., 2011) proposed an intrusion de-
tection system for Modbus protocol in power plants.
Their approach is based on the concept of Critical
State Analysis and State Proximity. (Sayegh et al.,
2014) presented an anomaly-based intrusion detection
system developed for SCADA networks. In their ap-
proach, time correlation between different packets is
extracted to identify malicious events.
Besides the above IDS techniques, an emerging
research area for the utilisation of Artificial Intelli-
gence (AI) techniques such as ontology knowledge
representation, has been approached by researchers
and industry experts to design, implement, and en-
hance intrusion detection systems.
2.3 Ontology-based approaches for
Intrusion Detection
An ontology formally represents the knowledge
within a specific domain through a list of concepts
and their relationship in a format that is easy to under-
stand by human and machines. It provides machines
with powerful semantic-level capabilities such as log-
ical inferences and reasoning over existing knowl-
edge. However, the use of ontology approaches for
security monitoring in SCADA domain is still in its
infancy and little work is published in this regard.
(Barnett et al., 2012) developed an ontology for
the security of Smart grids. The proposed ontology
focuses on both physical and network specific risks.
The authors also developed a graphical user interface
(GUI) that displays the results of a Failures mode
effects analysis based on the prioritisation by likeli-
hood, detectability, and severity. However, the built
ontology is simple and may not be suitable for intru-
sion detection. (Sheldon et al., 2013) proposed an on-
tology to assess root causes and impacts of cyber in-
trusions on SCADA systems. Nevertheless, the evalu-
ation results are not provided in this work. (Sartakov,
2015) proposed the use of an ontological represen-
tation of networks for intrusion detection in Cyber-
Physical systems. The proposed approach combines
both logical and physical elements of the network that
are used to build a specification model. Nevertheless,
the proposed ontology is very general and it is not
clear whether some specific industrial protocols are
considered in the modelling or not.
The use of ontology has also appeared in several
European Framework Programmes (FP7) projects and
practical implementations, but with different objec-
tives than for intrusion detection. In SERSCRIS
project (Surridge et al., 2012), an ontology was con-
structed to describe generic system assets, threats, se-
curity controls and their relationships in critical in-
frastructure networks. However, the scope of pub-
lished work is limited to the modelling of threats and
vulnerabilities rather than using it for run-time mon-
itoring. In another project named INSPIRE (Choras´
et al., 2010), a decision-aid tool for diagnostic and re-
covery is proposed using ontology. The constructed
ontology describes SCADA interdependencies, vul-
nerabilities, and threats. However, the proposed on-
tology is focused on diagnostics and may not be suit-
able for our intrusion detection objective.
Despite the recent advances in security researches
for industrial control systems (ICS), it is clear that the
use of ontology approaches for intrusion detection in
SCADA domain is limited. An ontology can provide
several advantages and enables enhanced information
analysis to the intrusion detection task. This includes
representing the knowledge in a clear structure and
with powerful semantic-level capabilities such logi-
cal inferences and reasoning over existing knowledge.
Therefore, we propose an ontology-based intrusion
detection system for use in SCADA networks.
3 ONTOLOGY-BASED SCADA
IDS (OSCIDS)
The ontology-based intrusion detection framework
presented in this paper is a knowledge-based sys-
tem. It utilises the power of semantic data definitions
to capture and represent intrusion-related knowledge
within the domain in a formal language that is un-
derstood by both humans and machines. This data
representation, backed up by the semantic definitions,
enables expressing the relationships among the hier-
archically organised concepts of the data. Therefore,
new capabilities related to the classification and rea-
soning over the existing data are made possible. The
OSCIDS framework is prototyped in Java language
on top of the open-source Apache Jena API frame-
work (Jena, 2011). Jena provides an extensive set of
features for processing ontology such as triples stor-
age, inferences and rule engines, and querying en-
gines.
3.1 Architecture
The overall architecture of OSCIDS is presented in
Figure 2. It consists of several components that are
described as follows.
• Knowledge Base (KB): This component provides
a repository storage for all the knowledge ele-
ments used by the framework. This includes
the ontological models, processed network pack-
ets, attack instances, classes relationships, se-
mantic rules, and any other related information.
This component is implemented using JENA TDB
(Triple Store Database) which provides a persis-
tent storage on hard drives with a high perfor-
mance and the datasets are protected against ac-
cidental corruption, unexpected process termina-
tions and system crashes.
• Semantic Protocol Analyser: This component
is responsible for the processing of raw network
packets and the extraction of main features includ-
ing the Modbus application-layer as per the devel-
oped ontology model. Then, it creates a packet in-
stance in the knowledge base under a proper class
such as Modbus TCP instance. This component
is developed in Java language using JNETPCAP
library with integration to Jena API functions to
allow accessing and modifying the data in the KB.
• Inference and Rule Engines: This component of
the framework enables rules evaluation on the ex-
isting knowledge (such as packet instances) and
the retrieval of information stored in the KB. Us-
ing a set of ontological statements (such as restric-
tions and truth conditions), it can automatically
derive additional information to enhance the qual-
ity of existing data. For example, new semantic
features such as the packet type, the application
layer payload type, the characteristic of the used
industrial command can be generated out of the
raw packet features.
• Classification and Detection Module: This
module facilitates the communication interface
between all the system components and controls
the overall workflow. It is responsible for guiding
other components to the intrusion detection task
and taking the final decisions when required.
Figure 2: Overall OSCIDS Framework Architecture
3.2 Workflow
The main activities of the framework are illustrated in
figure 3, and the step by step operating process is as
follows:
The raw network packets are captured and fed
into the system and handled by the semantic proto-
col analyser (Step 1). The semantic protocol analyser
retrieves the network communications model (ontol-
ogy) (Step 2) and uses the encoded knowledge about
Modbus TCP/IP and other defined communications
characteristics to extract the main packet features.
The resultant packet with its extracted features is con-
verted to a Resource Description Framework (RDF)
format and added to the knowledge base under a
proper class as Modbus-TCP, TCP (non-Modbus), or
UDP packet instances (Step 3). Next, the process han-
dling task is forwarded to the classification and detec-
tion module (Step 4). This module instructs the infer-
ence and rule engine to execute various semantic rules
for reasoning and attack detection (Step 5). These
rules are loaded from text files (Step 6) and their exe-
cution results are returned back (Step 7). If the system
determined that a malicious packet has been found, an
alert is created in the KB and sent to the security ana-
lyst (Step 8).
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Figure 3: OSCIDS Framework Work-flow
3.3 Ontology Development
The SCADA intrusion knowledge is captured and
encoded using ontology. The constructed on-
tology defines the Modbus TCP communications,
Cyber-attacks, and the logical relationships among
packet and attack instances. This model is derived
by analysing the protocol specifications (Modbus,
2012) and attack taxonomies (Drias et al., 2015;
Hadzˇiosmanovic´ et al., 2014). A high-level represen-
tation of the developed ontology is depicted in Figure
4.
The main concepts (classes) contained in this
ontology are presented in Table 1. The described
classes, which include TCP packet, Modbus TCP/IP
Packet, and Attack instance, are used to describe dif-
ferent types of data and their definition. Each of these
classes may have several subclasses and properties
organised in a hierarchy. For instance, the Modbus
TCP class has several subclasses such as Request-
Message, Response-Message, and Modbus-Header.
Table 1: Main classes contained in the SCADA intrusion
ontology
Class Description
TCP
Packet
This class represents an instance of a
network packet. This includes all TCP
packets whether it has Modbus com-
munication or not.
Modbus
Packet
This class is used to represent instances
of Modbus TCP packets and their fea-
tures.
Attack This class represents the cyber-attack
instances on SCADA systems. It has
several attack information such as im-
pact, affected systems, attack descrip-
tion, and attack vector.
Moreover, in ontology, the relationship between
classes are defined using object properties, while the
data properties are used to describe the data values,
as presented in Table 2. The logical relationships de-
scribe the connection between different elements of
an attack. For example, an [Attacker] performs an
[Attack] which occurred at a specific [Time] and has
an [Impact] on the [Target]. This [Attack] uses a
[Mechanism] to exploit a [Vulnerability] utilising a
[Protocol] packet message.
Table 2: Properties contained in the SCADA intrusion on-
tology
Domain Properties
TCP
packet
hasTime, hasTCPLength, hasSrcIP,
hasSrcPort, hasSrcMAC, hasDstIP,
hasDstPort, hasDstMAC
Modbus
packet
hasModbusTransID, hasMod-
busUnitID, hasModbusProtoID,
hasModbusLen, hasModbusFC, has-
ModbusSubFC, hasMExcepCode,
hasModbusPacketType
Network
packet
hasImpact, hasCount, isMalicious,
hasCorrelationID, hasAttackVector
3.4 Semantic Rules Generation
In this paper, a set of 15 rules were developed to vali-
date the proposed system capabilities in detecting ma-
licious Modbus communications, as shown in Listing
1. These rules cover various attacks such as denial
of service, protocol specification violation, system in-
tegrity, and reconnaissance attacks. Some rules were
also used to derive additional knowledge from the raw
packet data that can be used by other attack detection
rules.
Listing 1: Semantic detection rules using Jena format
[Rule01: (?p ics:hasSrcPort 502) −> (?p ics:hasPacketType ”Response”)]
[Rule02: (?p ics:hasDstPort 502) −> (?p ics:hasPacketType ”Request”)]
[Rule03: (?p ics:hasTCPlen ?TCPLen), greaterThan(?TCPLen,300) −> (?
p ics:hasImpact ”Specification−Violation”)(?p ics:hasAttackVector
”Oversized packet length”)(?p ics:isMalicious ”Yes”)]
[Rule04: (?p ics:hasProtoID ?ProtocolID), notEqual(?ProtocolID,0) −> (?
p ics:hasImpact ”Specification−Violation”)(?p ics:hasAttackVector
”Illegal ModbusTCP Protocol ID”)(?p ics:isMalicious ”Yes”)]
[Rule05: (?p ics:hasModbusLen ?Len), greaterThan(?Len,254) −> (?p ics:
hasImpact ”Specification−Violation”)(?p ics:hasAttackVector ”
Oversized Modbus packet length”)(?p ics:isMalicious ”Yes”)]
[Rule06: (?p ics:hasUnitID ?UnitID), greaterThan(?UnitID,247) −> (?p
ics:hasImpact ”Specification−Violation”)(?p ics:hasAttackVector ”
Illegal Modbus Unit ID”)(?p ics:isMalicious ”Yes”)]
[Rule07: (?p ics:hasPacketType ”Request”),(?p ics:hasFunctionCode ?FC),
greaterThan(?FC,127) −> (?p ics:hasImpact ”Specification−
Violation”)(?p ics:hasAttackVector ”Out of range Modbus Function
Code”)(?p ics:isMalicious ”Yes”)]
[Rule08: (?p ics:hasFunctionCode 8)(?p ics:hasSubFunctionCode 10) −>
(?p ics:hasImpact ”System−Integrity”)(?p ics:hasAttackVector ”
CLEAR−AUDIT−COUNTERS−DIAG−REGISTERS”)(?p ics:
isMalicious ”Yes”)]
[Rule09: (?p ics:hasFunctionCode 8)(?p ics:hasSubFunctionCode 4) −> (?
p ics:hasImpact ”Denial−of−Service”)(?p ics:hasAttackVector ”
FORCE−LISTEN−ONLY−MODE”)(?p ics:isMalicious ”Yes”)]
[Rule10: (?p ics:hasFunctionCode 8)(?p ics:hasSubFunctionCode 1) −> (?
p ics:hasImpact ”Denial−of−Service”)(?p ics:hasAttackVector ”
RESTART−COMMUNICATIONS−OPTION”)(?p ics:isMalicious
”Yes”)]
[Rule11: (?p ics:hasFunctionCode 43) −> (?p ics:hasImpact ”System−
Reconnaissance”)(?p ics:hasAttackVector ”READ−DEVICE−ID”)
(?p ics:isMalicious ”Yes”)]
[Rule12: (?p ics:hasExceptionCode 6) −> (?p ics:hasImpact ”Denial−of−
Service”)(?p ics:hasAttackVector ”SLAVE−DEVICE−BUSY”)(?p
ics:isMalicious ”Yes”)]
[Rule13: (?p ics:hasFunctionCode 17) −> (?p ics:hasImpact ”System−
Reconnaissance”)(?p ics:hasAttackVector ”REPORT−SERVER−
INFORMATION”)(?p ics:isMalicious ”Yes”)]
[Rule14: (?p ics:hasExceptionCode 5) −> (?p ics:hasImpact ”Denial−of−
Service”)(?p ics:hasAttackVector ”ACKNOWLEDGE−
EXCEPTION−CODE−DELAY”)(?p ics:isMalicious ”Yes”)]
[Rule15: (?p ics:hasDstPort 502)(?p ics:hasPayloadType ”Non−Modbus−
TCP”) −> (?p ics:hasImpact ”Specification−Violation”)(?p ics:
hasAttackVector ”Non−Modbus Communication on TCP Port 502”)
(?p ics:isMalicious ”Yes”)]
Figure 4: High-level view of the proposed SCADA intrusion ontology
4 OSCIDS FRAMEWORK
EVALUATION
In order to validate the proposed OSCIDS frame-
work, we conducted several experiments using mul-
tiple datasets. The experimental results and compar-
ison to state of the art solutions are provided in this
section. Snort IDS with the QuickDraw (Peterson,
2009) Modbus preprocessor and rule-set is used for
comparison as a state-of-the-art solution.
4.1 Experiments Setup and Datasets
The architecture of research test-bed used for the ex-
periments is illustrated in Figure 5. It contains sev-
eral components including 1) A simulated Modbus
Server using ConPot industrial honey-pot. 2) A Mod-
bus Client with a Python script that is configured to
poll Modbus measurements at a defined time interval
for the generation of benign traffic. 3) An attacker
machine with KALI-Linux distribution for penetra-
tion testing. 4) Snort IDS with Quick-draw. 5) The
proposed OSCIDS framework prototype.
Furthermore, two datasets of network traffic cap-
tures (PCAP) were used. The first set was ob-
tained from Digital Bond (Peterson, 2009). The sec-
ond dataset is constructed using our research test-bed
components, which includes both benign and mali-
cious traffic samples.
Modbus Server
Modbus Client
Ethernet Switch
ConPot simulation
with Python scripts
OSCIDS
Attacker
KALI-Linux
Proposed IDS
Figure 5: Experimental Test-bed Architecture
4.2 Experiment 1: Ontology-based vs.
Snort Intrusion Detection
This experiment aims at evaluating the attack detec-
tion capability of our proposed system and provid-
ing a comparison to state-of-the-art Snort IDS with
QuickDraw (Peterson, 2009). The experimental pro-
cess was developed as follows. First, the two datasets
described previously are fed into running instances of
Snort IDS (with QuickDraw) and the proposed IDS
framework. The results of each system were recorded
and used for comparison.
In this experiment, a total of 468 network pack-
ets were processed by our system. Out of these
packets, 331 Modbus-TCP packets were converted to
RDF instances with the class type of Modbus Packet,
while 137 (Non-Modbus) packets were added as TCP
Packet instances.
The proposed system was successfully able to de-
rive a set of additional features to the raw packet in-
formation. These features include, but not limited
to, the packet payload type (TCP or Modbus TCP),
Modbus message type (Request/Response), function
or exception codes description. Furthermore, the
evaluation of semantic detection rules on the pack-
ets resulted in identifying malicious packet instances.
The detected attack includes System-Reconnaissance
(51.14%), Denial-of-Service (12.7%), Specification-
Violation (0.09%), System-Integrity (0.18%), and
Miscellaneous (33%). An example Modbus packet
instance with the extended features in RDF triples for-
mat is illustrated in Listing 2.
Listing 2: A malicious Modbus packet instance in RDF for-
mat
<r d f : D e s c r i p t i o n r d f : a b o u t =” h t t p : / / SCADA. ICS / OIDS /
n e t w o r k t r a f f i c .OWL#MODBUSTCPpacket22”>
< i c s : isMalicious>Yes</ i c s : i s M a l i c i o u s>
< i c s : hasTime>2015−08−22 13 : 0 1 : 4 4 .837161</
i c s : h a s T i m e>
< i c s : hasAttackVector>CLEAR−AUDIT−COUNTERS−DIAG−
REGISTERS</ i c s : h a s A t t a c k V e c t o r>
< i c s : hasImpact>System− I n t e g r i t y</ i c s : h a s I m p a c t>
< i c s : hasPacketType>Reques t</ i c s : h a s P a c k e t T y p e>
< i c s : hasUnitID>10</ i c s : h a s U n i t I D>
< i c s : hasModbusLen>6</ i c s :hasModbusLen>
< i c s : hasTransID>0</ i c s : h a s T r a n s I D>
< i c s : hasDstPort>502</ i c s : h a s D s t P o r t>
< i c s : hasPayloadType>Modbus−TCP</ i c s : h a s P a y l o a d T y p e>
< i c s : hasFunctionCodeLabel>D i a g n o s t i c s ( 0 8 )</
i c s : h a s F u n c t i o n C o d e L a b e l>
< i c s : hasSrcMAC>00 : 2 0 : 7 8 : 0 0 : 6 2 : 0 D</ ics :hasSrcMAC>
< i c s : hasProtoID>0</ i c s : h a s P r o t o I D>
< i c s : hasTCPlen>66</ i c s : h a s T C P l e n>
< i c s : hasDstMAC>00 : 0 2 : B 3 : C E : 7 0 : 5 1</ ics :hasDstMAC>
< i c s : hasDstIP>1 9 2 . 1 6 8 . 0 . 3</ i c s : h a s D s t I P>
< i c s : hasFunctionCode>8</ i c s : h a s F u n c t i o n C o d e>
< i c s : hasSrcPort>2578</ i c s : h a s S r c P o r t>
< i c s : hasSrcIP>1 9 2 . 1 6 8 . 0 . 5 7</ i c s : h a s S r c I P>
< i c s : hasSubFunctionCode>10</ i c s : h a s S u b F u n c t i o n C o d e>
</ r d f : D e s c r i p t i o n>
Moreover, a brief security alert is forwarded to the
security analyst or console in standard Syslog format
(RFC 3164) as following:
<0> 2015−08−22 1 3 : 0 1 : 4 4 . 8 3 7 1 6 1 OSCIDS IDS SB−011
S u s p i c i o u s Modbus D i a g n o s t i c code (CLEAR−AUDIT
−COUNTERS−DIAG−REGISTERS ) has been
s u c c e s s f u l l y e x e c u t e d on a Modbus d e v i c e
1 9 2 . 1 6 8 . 1 . 1 0 2578 1 9 2 . 1 6 8 . 1 . 2 2 2 502
A comparison of the attack detection rate, false
positives, and accuracy between the proposed system
and Snort IDS is presented in Table 3. The proposed
system was also assessed on its performance. It took
the system 492.77 Milliseconds (0.49277 Second) to
process and create 468 packet instances in RDF for-
mat. While applying the 15 semantic rules for in-
ference and attack detection took 21.86 Milliseconds
(0.02186 Second).
Table 3: Comparison of attack detection rates between the
proposed OSCIDS and Snort IDS
IDS Detection
Rate (%)
False Pos-
itive (%)
Accuracy
(%)
OSCIDS 97.80 1.09 96.70
Snort IDS 96.70 1.64 94.50
4.3 Experiment 2: Complex attack
detection and correlation
In this experiment, we assess the proposed system for
its ability in correlating various packet to provide se-
curity analyst with useful insights of the network se-
curity. Many attacks against SCADA systems are a
sequence of individual attack steps. The derived fea-
tures by the reasoning engine and the developed on-
tology can provide a base for correlating malicious
events and detecting more complex attack scenarios.
For instance, several packets can be correlated us-
ing their shared impact on the system, or their be-
havioural reflection on the system (e.g., causing same
Modbus exceptions). Searching and extracting infor-
mation from the background knowledge is performed
through SPARQL queries (Harris et al., 2013).
As a demonstration example, let us assume
that a specific Modbus server (with IP address =
192.168.0.3) is under an attack originating from the
Attacker (with IP address = 192.168.0.57). A list of
all malicious packet flows between the two systems
can be retrieved using the following SPARQL query:
Listing 3: SPARQL Query to retrieve all malicious packets
between two nodes
SELECT ∗ WHERE {{? p i c s : h a s S r c I P ’ 1 9 2 . 1 6 8 . 0 . 5 7 ’ . ?
p i c s : h a s D s t I P ’ 1 9 2 . 1 6 8 . 0 . 3 ’ . } UNION {? p i c s :
h a s S r c I P ’ 1 9 2 . 1 6 8 . 0 . 3 ’ . ? p i c s : h a s D s t I P ’
1 9 2 . 1 6 8 . 0 . 5 7 ’ . } ? p i c s : ha sPacke tType ?
Packe tType . ? p i c s : h a s I m p a c t ? imp ac t . ? p i c s :
h a s A t t a c k V e c t o r ? A t t a c k V e c t o r .}
The SPARQL query resulted in a total of 29 packet
instances which contain both request and response
Modbus messages. However, different from Snort
IDS, the proposed system extracts the response mes-
sage description about the command execution and
combines this information with the request pair using
a unique message correlation ID. Therefore, the final
list of correlated packets for the selected two systems
is presented in Table 4.
Table 4: Final list of the correlated communication packets between the two systems
Packet ID Source IP Server IP Payload Attack Vector Impact Status
MODBUS7 192.168.0.57 192.168.0.3 Modbus FORCE LISTEN ONLY MODE Denial of Service Failed
MODBUS9 192.168.0.57 192.168.0.3 Modbus FORCE LISTEN ONLY MODE Denial of Service Failed
MODBUS11 192.168.0.57 192.168.0.3 Modbus FORCE LISTEN ONLY MODE Denial of Service Failed
TCP13 192.168.0.57 192.168.0.3 Non Modbus Non Modbus Communication Specification Violation
MODBUS14 192.168.0.57 192.168.0.3 Modbus RESTART COMMUNICATIONS OPTION Denial of Service Failed
MODBUS16 192.168.0.57 192.168.0.3 Modbus RESTART COMMUNICATIONS OPTION Denial of Service Successful
MODBUS19 192.168.0.57 192.168.0.3 Modbus RESTART COMMUNICATIONS OPTION Denial of Service Successful
TCP21 192.168.0.57 192.168.0.3 Non Modbus Non Modbus Communication Specification Violation
MODBUS22 192.168.0.57 192.168.0.3 Modbus CLEAR AUDIT DIAG REGISTERS System Integrity Successful
MODBUS25 192.168.0.57 192.168.0.3 Modbus CLEAR AUDIT DIAG REGISTERS System Integrity Successful
MODBUS39 192.168.0.57 192.168.0.3 Modbus REPORT SERVER INFORMATION System Reconnaissance Successful
MODBUS42 192.168.0.57 192.168.0.3 Modbus REPORT SERVER INFORMATION System Reconnaissance Successful
5 CONCLUSION
According to the aforementioned experiments and re-
sults, it is clear that the proposed ontology-based IDS
(OSCIDS) is an effective tool for the detection of
intrusions and malicious industrial communications.
The use of ontology modelling can provide rich se-
mantic logics in the represented intrusion knowledge.
This enables advanced capabilities such as reason-
ing and deriving additional useful information from
the existing knowledge, that is beyond the traditional
IDS systems which utilise basic taxonomy represen-
tations. Furthermore, the correlation between packets
or attacks can be made using flexible features that are
not limited to the raw packet information (e.g., Source
IP address) but can utilise the semantic meaning of
the data (e.g., the impact on the system, the purpose
of the command). We intend to apply the proposed
approach on other industrial protocols such as DNP3.
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